I'm a third-year PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania, where I work with
Cristina Bicchieri,
Daniel J. Singer, and Carlos Santana.
Alongside the PhD, I'm completing an M.A. in Statistics at Wharton.
I study the institutions of science the way an auditor studies a firm: looking for structural problems that are hiding in plain sight. Scientific monopolists are stifling the innovation that only comes from diverse, decentralized inquiry. Skepticism norms applied wrong hollow out the trust networks that science quietly depends on. The social contract between science and society was built on separation, and it is showing its age. I want to find these problems, name them, and make the case for changing them.
Outside of research, I hike and take photographs, sometimes at the same time.
Science is organized by institutions, and institutions have a grammar. I study the grammar by combining philosophy of science, social epistemology, and computational social science.
Published
Preregistration Is Not a Ceiling: But It Can Become One
Luca Garzino Demo
Synthese, 205(3): 126, 2025
Preregistration is designed as a solution to questionable research practices, safeguarding the epistemic integrity of scientific work. Despite its benefits, concerns remain that it might inadvertently suppress creativity and exploration, diminishing epistemic diversity. To engage with this debate, I employ an agent-based model to analyze how different preregistration regimes influence scientific communities. I argue that the coexistence of different research types is heavily dependent on the existing reward structures in academia, rather than on preregistration itself. Interestingly, I find that universally mandatory preregistration, compared to mere incentivization, promotes a more balanced coexistence of research methodologies, contingent upon how rewards are distributed between confirmatory and exploratory research. In light of arguments and results, I propose practical improvements for implementing preregistration, including a two-tier publication system for exploratory research and the adoption of registered reports. This approach aims to foster an environment where both diversity and integrity can thrive, addressing the underlying institutional biases.
In our review, we explore two different flavors of social norms: strength and stability. These two fundamental features are crucial for understanding norm change and designing effective interventions. Strong norms, which significantly influence behavior and are widely adopted, and stable norms, which endure over time, are essential for group coordination and addressing collective challenges. Using game theory, we discuss what constitutes norms' strength, drawing on Bicchieri's framework and tightness-looseness theory. Using the game-theoretic notion of evolutionary stable states, we also differentiate between strength and stability, listing possible enforcement mechanisms like punishment, gossip, and perceived legitimacy. Here we argue that stability is not a mere consequence of strength but a different feature of norms that is separate but linked. We conclude by highlighting the need for a theoretical definition of stability, incorporating various mechanisms from the literature to provide a robust theoretical framework for future research on social norms.
Kant's Odd Experiment: Hypothesis Testing in Experiments of Pure Reason
Luca Garzino Demo
Under review
In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant famously compares his philosophical project to an experiment. He claims that his method consists in seeking "the elements of pure reason in that which admits of being confirmed or refuted through an experiment" (Bxviii). While many scholars have glossed over this metaphor, in this paper I explore Kant's scientific analogies in depth. First, I analyze the hypotheses underlying Kant's experiment and I evaluate them using his own critical framework. Then, I examine the experiment as it unfolds in the Transcendental Dialectic. By doing this, I show how Kant's experimental framework reveals an underappreciated aspect of his philosophy: the crucial role of experience in adjudicating philosophical claims.
The Future of AI Is Many, Not One
Daniel J. Singer & Luca Garzino Demo
In preparation
The way that we're thinking about generative AI right now is fundamentally individual. We see this not just in how users interact with models but also in how models are built, how they're benchmarked, and how commercial and research strategies using AI are defined. We argue that we should abandon this approach if we're hoping for AI to support groundbreaking innovation and scientific discovery. Drawing on research in complex systems, organizational behavior, and philosophy of science, we show why we should expect deep intellectual breakthroughs to come from epistemically diverse groups of AI agents working together rather than singular superintelligent agents. Having a diverse team broadens the search for solutions, delays premature consensus, and allows for the pursuit of unconventional approaches. Developing AI teams like these also addresses AI critics' concerns that current models are constrained by past data and lack the creative insight required for innovation. The upshot, we argue, is that the future of transformative transformer-based AI is fundamentally many, not one.
The Case Against Scientific Monopolies
Luca Garzino Demo
In preparation
Transitive Trust in Epistemic Networks
Luca Garzino Demo
In preparation
Presentations
April 2026
Transitive Trust in Epistemic Networks Talk
Computational Social Philosophy Seminars
On why asking around in epistemic network is a truth-conducing practice.
July 2025
Against Scientific Fame, Toward Epistemic Antitrust Talk
Institutional Epistemology Workshop, Helsinki
On why the credit economy in science creates monopolies, and what an antitrust framework for scientific institutions might look like.
November 2024
Preregistration Is Not a Ceiling: But It Can Become One Poster
Philosophy of Science Association Biennial Conference
How preregistration regimes interact with academic reward structures, and when the cure risks becoming a constraint.
April 2024
Norm Strength and Norm Stability Talk
Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable, Dallas
Why strong norms aren't always stable ones, and what that distinction means for designing interventions.
February 2023
Do Scientists Need to Be Pushed to Practice Open Science? Talk
SISEC, University of Brescia
Exploring whether open science practices can emerge voluntarily through disclosure incentives, or whether mandates are necessary.
Teaching
One of the best surprises of graduate school has been discovering how much I love teaching. There's something deeply rewarding about seeing students to think about hard questions.
Below are the courses I've had the pleasure of TAing, and a couple I dream of teaching one day.
Teaching Assistant — University of Pennsylvania
2026
Introductory Logic
Instructor: Daniel J. Singer
2025
Introduction to Philosophy
Instructor: Michael Weisberg
2025
Social Contract
Instructor: Jennifer Morton
2024
Knowledge and Reality
Instructor: Daniel J. Singer
Courses I'd Love to Teach
—
Institutions of Science
Heavily inspired by a seminar with Carlos Santana. The course would examine how funding structures, credit norms, peer review, and lab organization shape what gets discovered and what doesn't. Equal parts philosophy of science, science policy, and institutional design.
—
Social Norms and Collective Action
How do norms emerge, persist, and change, and how can we use that knowledge to address collective challenges? Drawing on social philosophy and behavioral science, this course would use social norms frameworks to think about four applied problems: climate change, science organization, honor norms and misinformation.
Photography
XPan
a.k.a. the superior aspect ratio
1 / 7
Rotate your phone for the full panoramic experience
